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Edgar: The Bystander's Duty and the Law of Torts - An Alternative Propos

THE BYSTANDER'S DUTY AND THE LAW OF TORTSAN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
J. H. EDGAR, JR.*

Sometime early during Torts class, the law student is confronted with
the problem posed by the bystander's duty. The fact pattern may vary,
but often it is the hypothetical question of the duty of the bystander to
the blind person who unknowingly approaches and falls off a cliff.' It
is sometimes based upon reported cases in which a person watches the
helpless victim drown 2 or become entangled in an oil field pumping
unit.' It may also arise from a true to life situation in which a person is
mugged, victimized, and killed while passersby and neighbors ignore the
cries for help.4 The common thread running throughout these situations is that the bystander has no legal duty to aid. The blind can be
crushed at the bottom of the precipice, the helpless can drown, the
woman can be attacked and gang raped while the bystander, as a result
of indifference, callousness, or perhaps, sadistic pleasure of seeing another's agony, does nothing and incurs no legal liability.
A number of different disciplines have tried to explain the historic
development of this area of tort law." It has been rationalized as a
logical extension of our rugged individualism-the desire not to get
involved and to mind one's own business. 6

Tort scholars have ex-

* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University; B.A., Texas A & M University; LL.B.,
University of Texas.
1. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1027
(1928).
2. Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. 1959).
3. Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co., 526 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ
granted) (bystander had ample opportunity to observe and warn victim). The author's
submission of an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner's application for writ of
error to the Texas Supreme Court in this case formed the basis for this article.
4. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4. The Times reported three separate
stabbings on March 13, 1964, which resulted in the death of Catherine Genovese in
Queens, New York. During the attack at least 38 persons observed her plight and cries
for help, yet did nothing.
5. A series of excellent articles, essays, and addresses by foreign and domestic law
professors, a newspaper editor, a psychiatrist, a sociologist, a police administrator, and a
philosopher are collected in THE GooD SAMAIUTA 1 AND THE LAW (J.M. Ratcliffe ed.
1966).
6. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law in
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE

THE

LAW 31 (J.M. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
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plained it on the basis that a legal duty requires either affirmative
conduct on the part of the defendant, or a special relationship between
the parties or one for whom the defendant is legally responsible.' In the
absence of these elements, a failure to act does not give rise to a legal
duty. To be sure, such a cavalier regard for life and limb has been
severely criticized by many able scholars." The courts, however, have
steadfastly refused to be swayed from the traditional view that the true
bystander is under no legal duty to the victim.
One must admit that if the bystander were placed under a legal duty
to attempt rescue or render active assistance to the victim, many problems would arise. For example, should the duty of a professional (such
as a physician) be the same as the non-professional? If the bystander
were required to intervene and aid in rescue, should the original victim
be required to indemnify or otherwise compensate the rescuer for any
injury to the latter's person or property resulting from the rescue attempt? The same problem would arise concerning legal responsibility
to an innocent third party who was damaged during the rescue operation. In an effort to solve some of these perplexing problems, a model
act 9 and rule' have been proposed. One state has even enacted a
criminal statute imposing a maximum fine of one hundred dollars for
failure to render aid."
Whether society is ready to impose a common law duty upon the mere
observer to rescue or render active aid is doubtful. For that matter, if
and when it will ever take such a step is questionable. Admittedly,
strong policy arguments can be advanced against requiring the bystander to subject himself to peril and injury by wrestling the blind man from
the edge of the cliff, by risking drowning to prevent another from death
by the same method, and being beaten and maimed to thwart the attack
upon another.
7. See, e.g., C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 141-44 (1953); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
§ 56, at 338-39 (4th ed. 1971); GREEN, The Duty Problem in

OF THE LAW OF TORTS

Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1026-28 (1928).
8. See generally Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112 (1908); Bohlen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 316
(1908); D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798 (1976)
(instead of civil sanctions, criminal penalties are suggested for a failure to rescue);
McNeice & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949); Seavey, I
Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1960); Snyder, Liability for
Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L. REV. 446 (1949).
9. See Miller & Zimmerman, The Good Samaritan Act of 1966: A Proposal, in
THE

GOOD

SAMARITAN AND THE LAW

279 (J.M. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).

10. See Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44
(1965).
11. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
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The purpose of this article is to propose a middle ground---one
between the traditional concept of no duty at all and the suggested duty
of active aid and rescue. Let us simply impose a duty upon the
bystander to sound an alarm which would be appropriate under the
circumstances. It might take the form of an oral warning directly to the
victim that the latter is in a perilous position or, on the other hand, a
summons to the fire department, police, or an emergency medical unit
may be appropriate. The essential factor, however, is that regardless of
the nature of the warning it must correspond to the situation that has
elicited it.
By what process should we determine whether the law ought to
impose a duty of ordinary care upon the bystander who fails to sound an
alarm for someone who is either unaware of or unable to extricate
himself from a position of peril? Several choices are available. Some
tend to rely upon foreseeability as a test for duty.' 2 This test, however,
requires affirmative conduct by the defendant as one of its underlying
factors.'3 Also, if foreseeability of harm were the sole determinative
factor in establishing duty (i.e., if the risk is foreseeable, a duty arises to
protect against that risk), the law would have imposed a duty upon the
bystander long ago because it is certainly foreseeable that the blind man
will fall off the cliff if the bystander does nothing. Others have attempted to resolve the duty question under the generic terms of "proximate
cause" or "public policy."'1 4 One difficulty with this approach is that
these terms often have different meanings for different people and the
possibility of confusion is increased. Further, this method does not
require the court to state, analyze, evaluate, and discuss what factors
were utilized in reaching its judgment.
No one has attempted to articulate the technique by which the duty
question in negligence cases should be resolved more eloquently than my
respected mentor and friend, Leon Green.' 5 The method which he
suggests requires that the person attempting resolution of the duty issue
actually come to grips with the factors we often lump into either "public
12. See Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 508 (1883);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 291 (1965).

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
14. Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968)
("Kinsman No. 2"); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1928)
(dissenting opinion).
15. His contributions to legal education over the past sixty years, both in the

classroom and in legal writing, are vast. For an excellent collection of a few of his
writings which typify the process by which he would determine the duty question see L.
GREEN, THE LITIOATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

19761

BYSTANDER'S DUTY TO WARN

policy" or "proximate cause."' To the public, the practicing bar, and
the student, this procedure has many advantages. It requires the court
to recognize, consider, evaluate, and express each specific item which
forms a basis for its decision. On reading a reported case, one can
understand exactly why the court determined the duty issue in a particular way. 6 While we may not agree with the result the court reaches in
formulating its judgment, at least we know what the court is doing and
the reasons behind its decision. This is far more preferable than
17
resolving the duty issue under the guise of something else.
In resolving the issue of whether the bystander owes the helpless or
unaware victim the duty to sound an alarm, Green suggests that we
consider the following factors: administrative, moral or ethical, economic, justice, preventative, and precedential.' 8 An analysis using this
process might take a form similar to that set forth below.
The Administrative Factor

Several questions concerning judicial administration must be considered. If the court recognizes such a duty, will it create more problems
than it solves? Can the court system effectively administer such a duty?
These questions should present minimal, if any, problems. For example, the courts are already accustomed to efficiently handling the wellknown duty of the possessor of land to warn the invitee of known.
dangers and the duty of a motorist to warn by sounding a horn. Our
courts have no difficulty in these areas, and to impose a duty to warn in
the situation in question should create no additional administrative
problems.
The Moral or EthicalFactor

Moral and ethical considerations with philosophical and religious
overtones are ever-present factors to be considered. Deep, subjective
judgments are employed which vary from individual to individual, from
16. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) for an
example of how the court reached its finding on the duty issue.
17. For example, by what process does a court determine whether a cause is
proximate or remote, concurrent or intervening, foreseeable or unforeseeable, without
consideration of duty?
18. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 29 COLUM. L.
REv. 255 (1929); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV.

1014 (1928); Green, The Study and Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TExAs L. Rav. 1 (1955).
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court to court, and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Should the rugged
individualism of our heritage continue to prevail? Am I my brother's
keeper, if ever so slightly? Unless I have engaged in some affirmative
conduct toward the victim or bear some special relationship to him, why
cannot I ignore him or, if I desire, perhaps chuckle at his plight?
Hopefully, we, as individuals, and the court systems have reached a level
as a civilized society in which our humanitarian instincts are sufficiently
strong that a duty to warn is recognized as a minimum standard for the
type of case under consideration.1 9
The Economic Factor

At this point, a court is required to become pragmatic. It must
sharpen its pencil, add up the cost, and then balance the result of
imposing a duty versus not so doing. On one side of the ledger, we
have the value of the harm or hurt to the victim, whether it be great or
small. This must be compared to the defendant's cost in preventing the
risk of harm. Is it great or small? Admittedly, if the courts were to
impose a duty upon the bystander to intervene and rescue the victim, the
price might be too great. The court may not want to require the
bystander to subject himself to bodily injury in the rescue attempt.
Certainly the economical review of the cost to the rescuer may equal or
be greater than the harm to the victim. Such a consideration may be a
substantial factor in the court's declination to impose a common law
duty to rescue. But that is not the proposal herein advanced. A simple
warning, whether it be a shout to alert the victim to the peril, a
telephone call, or another type of alarm costs the bystander absolutely
nothing. Especially when we balance the cost of the warning with the
cost to the victim, the scale tips greatly in favor of imposing a duty to
warn.
The PreventativeFactor

Two allied considerations are involved in examining this particular
factor. First, who is in the best position to prevent the loss-the victim
19. Judicial recognition of this humanitarian principle has been exemplified in other
negligence cases. The defendant who has created an unreasonable risk of harm owes a
duty of ordinary care to the rescuer even though the latter knows or should know of the
peril. See Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921). By the same
token, the party who has the last clear chance or discovers the peril of the plaintiff has a
duty to exercise ordinary care without regard to the presence or absence of initial
primary or contributory negligence of the parties. Ford v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 151
Tex. 538, 541, 252 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1952).
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or the bystander? If the victim has been momentarily distracted or
otherwise unaware of the danger or is under physical attack or other
disability so that self-extrication is impractical, it seems clear that the
bystander is not only in the best position, but is in the last and only
position to avert the injury.20 The next phase of the problem involves
the question of whether the imposition of a duty to warn would minimize, eliminate, or prevent such losses. In other words, would a
warning to the blind man avert his fatal steps, a call to the lifeguard save
the drowning person, a summons to the police save a life from brutal
attack? The likelihood is extremely high that it would.
The Justice Factor
The justice factor is a very elusive, relative, judgmental concept at
best. While it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define the
word "justice" so that it covers all types of risks under all types of
circumstances, each of us has a visceral reaction when we feel that
justice has been either applied or ignored. It invokes the balancing
process of all the above factors using wisdom, objectivity, an innate
sense of fairness, pragmatism, and a crystal ball for good measure. Here
we see the role of the judiciary in using the most subjective process of
all. When all these matters are considered, the scales of justice should
be tipped in favor of imposing a duty on the bystander to sound an
alarm.
The PrecedentialFactor
There is no question that stare decisis plays a major role in the court's
determination of whether or not to impose legal responsibilities. It
should. Many virtues emanate from an organized, steady development
of legal principles. Society, to a large extent, actually depends on the
ability to rely upon the precept that the law yesterday will also be the
law today. If it were not for the dependability of this stablizing factor,
our economic, social, and political processes would have no base upon
which to build. But there are limits. As our needs change, our social
structure changes; the law must modify itself to meet such needs and
changes. Our highly industrialized, mobile society could not function
if, for example, our judicial system had not recognized that liability
20. This factor is also undoubtedly part of the underlying basis for recognizing the
doctrine of last clear chance or discovered peril. See Letcher v. Derricott, 383 P.2d 533,
537 (Kan. 1963).
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would result from the intentional inducement of another to breach a
contract, 21 that privity of contract would no longer insulate the manufacturer in negligence cases,2 2 and that recovery would be permitted for
injury caused by defective products without regard to negligence.23
Hundreds of additional examples could be used to illustrate the point
that precedent must and does give way to progress. Therefore, we
should be ready to accept this modest proposal by imposing a duty to
warn.
Recognition of a duty to warn does not mean that liability will follow.
Many bystanders do and will continue to warn, thus fulfilling their duty.
The more courageous will even attempt rescue. Even those who do
not warn may not be liable because the jury may not determine that the
failure to warn was negligent under the circumstances. For example,
some bystanders may become transfixed and so paralyzed with fright
that they cannot utter a sound. Others may suffer such an emotional
collapse that their ability to warn has been destroyed. In some cases,
the warning, although timely, may have been too late to avert tragedy.
In such instances, as in many negligence cases, the jury may properly
find either that the failure to warn was not negligence or that there was a
lack of requisite causal connection. Recovery may also be barred by
either the victim's contributory negligence or by the minimal amount of
damages resulting from the defendant's breach of his duty to warn.
To ask the court to impose a duty upon the bystander to warn is a
viable middle ground. Under the guidelines previously suggested, such
a duty is flexible enough to prevent injustice to the bystander while
reaching a more humanitarian result for the victim. The proposal is
workable and can avert useless tragedy. For the courts to ignore such
an approach to this problem would result in the perpetuation of a legal
anachronism.
21. Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
22. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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